General Liman von Sanders's Memorandum >Die Gründe für den militärischen Zusammenbruch der Türkei<
In December 1919 the British Military Mission in Warsaw received from the General Staff of the Polish Army a carbon copy of a report on the defeat of Turkey apparently written by General Otto Liman von Sanders, who had been head of the German Military Mission in Turkey at the outbreak of the First World War and had subsequently commanded Ottoman armies, and eventually an Ottoman army group, in the field 1 . The later successes of Polish Military Intelligence, for example in discovering the secret of the Enigma machine-coding system, make it plausible that they had indeed secured one of two or three copies of a highly confidential military document -the destruction in 1945 of the relevant parts of the Prussian Army archives means that it is no longer possible to check for other copies that may formerly have been in the files of the German General Staff. The translation of the report in the files of the British War Office is headed >Copy of a Report on Turkey, Said To Be Prepared For The German Staff By Gen. Liman V. Sanders< -and the initials on the German carbon do not seem quite like Liman von Sanders's, more like an attempt to imitate his writing by someone in a hurry, or ignorant of the first principles of forging other people's handwriting -but the document may be judged as genuine on internal grounds. What makes it particularly interesting is that it is much less veiled and circumspect than Liman von Sanders's memoirs, Fünf Jahre Türkei. It is published here for the first time.
Liman von Sanders had left Constantinople together with a large party of German troops on board the S.S. Etha Rickmers on 29 January 1919. Despite a verbal assurance of safe conduct to a North German port, he was asked to go ashore at Valetta on 25 February 1919, and was arrested. He spent the next six months writing letters, both in German and in excellent English, demanding explanation 3 ; When reports appeared in the London Daily Mail accusing him of involvement in massacres in Armenia and in Syria, he requested a court martial 4 . Generalmajor Hans von Seeckt, the former Chief of Staff of the Ottoman Army, had written his own >Die Gründe des Zusammenbruchs der Türkei Herbst 1918< as early as November 1918, on board a ship between Constantinople and Odessa 5 ; Liman von Sanders's worries concerning his detention in Malta, and the inadvisability of drawing up documents that might be confiscated by his guards and used as evidence against him, make it probable that his report on Turkey had also been written soon after the Turkish collapse, and had been completed some time prior to his arrest. The similarity in the titles of Seeckt's and Liman von Sander's memoranda may even suggest that they were written in direct and conscious competition with one another. The length and comparative insipidity of Fünf Jahre Türkei, and its speedy publication -it came out in November 1919, only three months after his return to Germanysuggest that Liman von Sanders may have written his book with the assistance of a ghost-writer: at any rate the difference of tone and emphasis between memorandum and book certainly suggests that between the writing of the one and the writing of the other some time had elapsed, with other more urgent preoccupations absorbing the author's attention.
In the aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles, signed while Liman von Sanders was under arrest in Malta, German military authorities had more urgent concerns than adjudication between the complaints in Seeckt's memorandum and the complaints in Liman von Sanders's, but the mere fact Seeckt became head of the Reichswehr in 1920 indicates that even in comparison with the titanic struggle in France and Flanders and on the Eastern front, German involvement in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War was regarded as very much more than a sideshow. Indeed the Turco-German military alliance of 1914-1918 is unique in the annals of coalition warfare. The German government supplied almost RM 4,000,000,000 to prop up the Ottoman Empire's currency, and more than RM 500,000,000 worth of war supplies, including four hundred and sixty aircraft and much of the Ottoman armies' artillery and machine guns 6 . Though German infantry units, eventually totalling no more than seven battalions (including the only unit specifically mentioned by Liman von Sanders in his memorandum, Kurhessisches Reserve-Jäger Bataillon 11) only began to arrive on the Palestine front in December 1917, technical units had been deployed to assist Ottoman formations at a much earlier date: already by August 1916 on the Palestine front alone there were eight German machine gun companies, four German heavy artillery batteries, four German Flak platoons, a German telephone company, a German aircraft unit and two German motor transport columns 7 . The number of German personnel in the Ottoman Empire rose from 6,500 in August 1916 to over 25,000 two years later. By mid 1918 there were also six Austro-Hungarian artillery batteries operating in Palestine, and in addition the Vienna government supplied equipment for a further fifty batteries, together with instruction teams 8 . Yet despite the key role played by this material and technical support, the relationship of Turkey and Germany was in no way one of subordination, as seen earlier with Britain and Portugal during the Napoleonic wars or later with the USA and South Vietnam in the 1960s. Assistance was in both directions. In 1918, following the military collapse of Russia, Enver Pa §a, the Ottoman Minister of War and Vice-generalissimo, began to pursue increasingly ambitious panTuranian objectives but for most of the war he held to what he told Hindenburg and Ludendorff when visiting them at Pleß shortly after they took charge of the Oberste Heeresleitung: >Die Entscheidung des ganzen Krieges fällt in Europa, und für den dortigen Kampf stelle ich alle meine Kräfte zur Verfügung 9 . < During the months following this visit, despite the fact that Ottoman armies were already heavily engaged with the British in Palestine and Mesopotania (Iraq) and with the Russians in north-eastern Turkey, no less than seven Ottoman divisions entered the line alongside allied forces in Galicia, Romania, and Macedonia; some of the Turkish troops sent to Romania were still there at the beginning of 1918, despite repeated requests from Enver for their return 10 . (It would be agreeable to report that the 19th and 20th Ottoman Divisions in Galicia found themselves up against the Corps expeditionnaire beige des auto-canons-mitrailleuses, sent by the Belgian government via Archangel to bolster the morale of the Russian army, but the Belgians were deployed on a different part of the Eastern front 11 .) What was most distinctive about the Turco-German coalition however was the German role in the higher command of the Ottoman armies, even before Enver's agreement to the subordination of the armed forces of Germany's three allies to the overall direction of the German O.H.L. German involvement in the direction of Ottoman troops went considerably further than the contemporary arrangement of mixing Austro-Hungarian and German divisions and corps under the same army headquarters, and appointing German chiefs of staff to Austro-Hungarian armies and army groups. Liman von Sanders and former war minister General Erich von Falkenhayn both commanded Ottoman army groups, Liman von Sanders having previously commanded an Ottoman army for more than three years, and the septuagenarian Prussian Generalfeldmarschall Colmar von der Goltz and Friedrich Freiherr Kreß von Kressenstein, a Bavarian colonel, both commanded Ottoman armies. Four other German officers commanded Ottoman army corps, and eleven others Ottoman divisions 12 . The formations in question were usually on key fronts, and the two most notable successes of Turkish arms during the war, the defence of the Gallipoli peninsula, and the siege of Kut, were both carried out under the direction of German commanders. It has to be said however, that the majority of Ottoman formations, including six of their nine armies, never had other than Turkish commanders. More important perhaps was that the Ottoman Chief of General Staff throughout the war was a German, initially Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorff but from the beginning of 1918 Hans von Seeckt, and that by January 1918 seven out of the twelve heads of subordinate General Staff departments were German, with German officers also associated with Turkish heads of equal military rank in a further two departments (Intelligence and the Inspectorate of the Zone of Communications) 13 .
It was something of a Turkish tradition to make use of foreign senior officersduring the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 for example Valentine Baker, in the interval between being kicked out of the British army for indecently assaulting a young lady in a railway compartment and becoming head of the Egyptian police, commanded a Turkish division, and even during the First World War a German-educated Venezuelan, Rafael de Nogales, having been turned down by the Belgian, Montenegrin and Serbian armies, served as a colonel with the Ottoman forces 14 but the Germans were always uncomfortably aware that they were never quite accepted by their Turkish hosts and their presence on the Ottoman general staff probably had less to do with any love of foreigners than with Enver's dislike of other Turks. Many senior Turkish officers were hostile to Enver on political grounds, others objected to his youth (he was still only 33 in 1914), and sneered at him as >a lad in general's uniforms and he found himself obliged to promote to corps command officers of the same age as himself, like Kemal (later Atatürk), with whom he was on distinctly cool terms, and even younger officers like ismet (later inönü), who was three years his junior and was only aged 32 when first appointed to the command of an army corps 15 . Without the Germans Enver would not have had enough competent officers whom he could trust to fill all the vacancies in an expanding military machine. As it turned out, the Turco-German collaboration was remarkably effective, Turkish officers often supporting the views of their German colleagues in disagreements with Enver, and German officers sometimes supporting Enver against his Turkish colleagues, with no appearance, until near the very end of the war, of disputes being on national rather than professional military grounds. Yet when Generalfeldmarschall von der Goltz died of typhus (with two German doctors in attendance) just before the surrender of Kut, there were immediate reports in the Entente press that he had been assassinated by a Turkish officer, and Liman von Sanders himself claimed that a Turkish staff officer forced on him by Enver had tried to poison him 16 . The Turkey of ninety years ago was far more oriental, even Arabian Nights-like, than it seems today, after decades of enthusiastic westernization, and German officers could never quite rid themselves of the notion that evert Turkish colleagues who spoke fluent French or German and had spent long periods in the West concealed behind a thin Jugendstil veneer the mind set of a Khayr ad-Din, perhaps even of a Jinghis Khan.
In some ways the most alarming Turk the Germans had to deal with was Enver himself 7 . Liman von Sanders's memorandum gives much greater emphasis than his book to the inadequacies of the Turkish leader and to the damage done by the conflicting views of the officers whom the German government sent out to help and advise the Turks. In Fünf Jahre Türkei Liman von Sanders's astonishment at Enver's megalomaniac disregard for the practicalities of logistics is merely hinted: >Zum Schluss unserer Unterredung äusserte er ganz phantastische, aber bemerkenswerte Ideen. Er sagte mir, dass er im Auge habe, später über Afghanistan nach Indien zu marschieren 18 . < In fact Enver was completely out of his depth with regard to the problems of directing a twentieth-century war, but Liman von Sanders argues in his memorandum that Enver was encouraged in his errors by German officers who themselves had no real idea of how difficult it was for an economically backward country like Turkey to maintain large armies on widely separated fronts. Generalmajor Otto von Lossow, the German military plenipotentiary (Militärbevollmäch-tigte) is mentioned only once, and in a different context, in Fünf Jahre Türkei, and Generalmajor von Seeckt is criticised merely for possessing >nur theoretisch< knowledge of Turkey 19 . Seeckt's own >Die Gründe des Zusammenbruchs der Türkei < memorandum, which is much better on the psychosocial and economic aspects of its subject than on issues of practical military strategy, tends to confirm Liman von Sanders's opinion of Seeckt's >nur theoretisch< understanding of the issues at stake; Seeckt for his part described the Military Mission of which Liman von Sanders was head as >ein schweres Hindernis für die Deutschen Interessen> sobald wirklich kriegerische Tätigkeit in Frage kam [..,] Unglücklicher konnte die Wahl der Chefs der Militärmission kaum ausfallen 20 . < Seeckt pretended to believe that Liman von Sanders had originally been sent to Turkey because he had been considered unsuitable to command an army corps. Bearing in mind that the extension of German influence in Turkey was a key element in pre-war German foreign policy, it seems however unlikely that Liman von Sanders's chief recommendation for an assignment requiring tact, empathy and a willingness to accommodate oneself to alien prejudices was his failure to make himself agreeable to his colleagues while commanding a division. He undoubtedly possessed a rather difficult personality but >sein krankhaftes Misstrauen gegen jeden< which Seeckt observed in Turkey may well have derived mainly from having to deal with people like Lossow and Seeckt 21 .
The real problem was the extraordinary arrangement of the chain of responsibility amongst the senior German officers in Turkey. Apart from Generalfeldmarschall Colmar von der Goltz, who had been assigned as military adviser to the Sultan but who eventually assumed a field command in Mesopotamia, and 25 . This objection was no doubt justified, and is not necessarily to be understood as a reflection on Liman's awkward personality; it was simply that he had far more military experience than Enver, and was senior to him in rank in the Ottoman army. Instead Seeckt, who had been the German chief of staff of an Austro-Hungarian army group on the Russian front, was sent to replace Bronsart von Schellendorff. One of Seeckt's first acts was to request the O.H.L. to place him in direct control of all German military personnel in the Ottoman Empire: after consultations however, Ludendorff decided that Seeckt,' since he was an officer seconded to the Ottoman service and subordinated to a Turkish superior, was not in as strong a position as Liman von Sanders, as head of a German mission, to look after the interests of German Army personnel 26 . In effect the O.H.L. failed to resolve the issue of conflicting responsibilities when it had an opportunity. The fact that Liman von Sanders, who from some points of view had the least important official position, was more than ten years older than either Lossow or Seeckt and two ranks senior in the German army, did not help matters. Bearing in mind that Turkey was unlikely to have won a war against an alliance of countries as industrially advanced as Britain and Russia, it is difficult to assess the real consequences of the conflict between Liman von Sanders, Lossow and Seeckt, but it must rank as one of the most unsatisfactory arrangements of overlapping responsibility in the annals of coalition warfare.
Die Gründe für den militärischen Zusammenbruch der Türkei
Nach Friedenschluss wird über alle mit dem Kriegsausgange zusammenhängen-den Umstände Rechenschaft gefordert werden, und somit auch über diejenigen, welche den militärischen Zusammenbruch der Türkei veranlasst haben, soweit Deutschland hieran beteiligt ist. Nachdem ich fast 5 Jahre an der Spitze der von Deutschland entsandten Militär-Mission gestanden habe und während der gesamten Kriegszeit türkische Armeen geführt habe, muss von mir verlangt werden, dass ich verantwortlich hierüber berichte. -Deutschland ist an den Ursachen mehr beteiligt als in der Heimat im Allgemeinen bekannt geworden ist. -In erster Linie ist das ganz irrige Urteil schuld, welches bei den deutschen obersten Behörden über die Person Enver-Paschas obwaltete.
Enver Pascha wurde in seinen geistigen und militärischen Fähigkeiten weit überschätzt, und seine Stellung und sein Einfluss in der Türkei wurden für sicher begründet gehalten, als sie schon längst erschüttert waren.
Auf diesen falschen Grundlagen hat Deutschland eine Enver-Militärpolitik getrieben anstatt einer türkischen Militärpolitik, das heisst eine persönliche und nicht sachliche Militärpolitik, da Enver in seiner masslosen Eitelkeit und später auch persönlichen Gewinnsucht seine eigenen Ziele denen seines Vaterlandes vorausstellte.
Ich habe oft vor dem bedingungslosen Anschluss an Enver gewarnt; da aber die anderen Dienststellen in der Türkei anders berichteten, sind meine Warnungen erfolglos geblieben.
Ich 
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The document in The Na tional Archives has no Anlagen. Liman von Sanders's references to the enclosure of original documents suggest either that he wrote this memorandum before he left Turkey, when he still had access to all the papers accumulated during the previous five years, or else that his personal luggage included a select file of documents which he intended to use for purposes of self-vindication. 
